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ROLAND BARTHES’ ‘TEXT’ AND ALEATORIC
MUSIC: IS THE ‘BIRTH OF THE READER’
THE BIRTH OF THE LISTENER?
Abstract : The history of Western classical music and the development of its
notational system show that composers have tried to control more and more
aspects of their compositions as precisely as possible. Total serialism represents
the culmination of compositional control. Given this progressively increasing
compositional control, the emergence of chance music, or aleatoric music, in the
mid-twentieth century is a significantly interesting phenomenon. In aleatoric
music, the composer deliberately incorporates elements of chance in the process
of composition and/or in performance. Consequently, aleatoric works challenge
the traditional notion of an art work as a closed entity fixed by its author.
        The philosophical root of aleatoric music can be traced to poststructuralism,
specifically its critique of the Enlightenment notion of the author as the creator of
the meaning of his or her work. Roland Barthes' declaration of "the death of the
author" epitomizes the poststructuralists' position. Distinguishing "Text" from
"Work," Barthes maintains that in a "Text," meanings are to be engendered not
by the author but by the reader. Barthes conceives aleatoric music as an example
of the "Text," which demands "the birth of the reader."
        This essay critically re-examines Barthes' notion of aleatoric music, focu-
sing on the complicated status of the reader in music. The readers of a musical
Text can be both performers and listeners. When Barthes' declaration of the birth
of the reader is applied to the listener, it becomes problematic, since the listener,
unlike the literary reader, does not have direct access to the "Text" but needs to
be mediated by the performer. As Carl Dahlhaus has remarked, listeners cannot
be exposed to other possible renditions that the performer could have chosen but
did not choose, and in this respect, the supposed openness of an aleatoric piece is
closed and fixed at the time of performance. In aleatoric music, it is not listeners
but only performers who are promoted to the rank of co-author of the works.
Finally, this essay explores the reason why Barthes turned to music for the
purpose of illustrating his theory of text. What rhetorical role does music play in
his articulation of "Work" and "Text"? Precisely because of music's "difference"
as a performance art, music history provides the examples of the lowest and the
highest moments in Barthes' theory of text, that is, those of Work and Text. If, for
Barthes, the institutionalization of the professional performer in music history
demonstrates the advent of Work better than literary examples, the performer's
supposed dissolution in aleatoric music is more liberating than any literary
moments of Text. This is because the figure of music--as performance art--
provides Barthes with a reified and bodily "situated" model of the Subject.
Key-Words: Roland Barthes, Post-structuralism, Aleatoric music.
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Traditionally, Western art has been a field in which chance had little or
no role to play. By making decisions about what to choose and what to
discard, artists create order out of chaos, and consequently, the role of
chance is supposed to be reduced in the process of creating order. If one
traces the history of Western art music and the developement of its
notational system, it is revealed that composers have tried to control more
and more aspects of their compositions as precisely as possible. Total
serialism represents the culmination of compositional control. Given this
progressively increasing compositional control, the emergence of chance
music, or aleatoric music, in the mid-twentieth century is a significantly
interesting phenomenon. In aleatoric music the composer incorporates
elements of chance in the process of composition and/or in performance.
The presence of chance elements is not entirely new in aleatoric music.
Whether or not is intended by the composer, chance has been an inherent
element in any kind of music: it is impossible for a composer to determine
perfectly all aspects of his or her composition, especially in its realization.
Even in electronic music, which has been regarded as music in which the
composer can totally avoid any unintended results, something different from
what is determined by the composer can be introduced. For instance, sounds
may be distorted in the process of reproduction, according to the acoustical
condition of the concert hall or the quality of the reproducing equipment. In
this respect what makes aleatoric music unique is the fact that chance
elements are not accidentally introduced but consciously intended by the
composer. However,aleatoric music is not unprecedented in the intentional
use of chance elements. Dice music of the eighteenth century is an example
of the early practice with chance. In this music, a certain aspect of a composi-
tion-usually the ordering of measures-was decided by throwing dice.
Although major composers of the eighteenth century such as Mozart and Haydn
were believed to practice dice music, it was not until the middle of the
twentieth century that chance operations emerged as an important
compositional method.
Increasing concern with chance and indeterminacy is part of a general
movement in twentieth-century philosophy, science, and other arts as well as
in music. In physics the deterministic theory of Newton’s action-reaction
mechanics was attacked by Einstein’s theory of relativity and quantum
physics, which admits the possibility of chance events at the level of sub-
atomic particles. In art, open-form works, such as graphic-notation in music
and Alexander Calder’s mobile sculpture in visual arts, exploit the aesthetics
of indeterminacy by letting the final product be determined by chance. In so
doing, these open-form works resist the traditional notion of an art work as a
closed entity fixed by its author.
This resistance not only reflects the general trend of the increasing
concern with indeterminacy in the twentieth century. Its theoretical root can
be traced to a particular philosophical and linguistic development known as
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poststructuralism, specifically its critique of the Enlightenment notion of the
author as the creator of the meaning of his or her work. Roland Barthes’
declaration of “the death of the author” epitomizes the poststructuralists’
position. Distinguishing “Text” from “Work,” Barthes maintains that in the
“text” meanings are to be engendered not by the author but by the reader.1 This
essay critically examines Barthes’ notion of aleatoric music in light of his theory
of  “Text.” We will argue that Barthes’ conception of the aleatoric music listener
as “the co-author” of a piece is problematic considering the complicated status
of the listener who, unlike the literary reader, does not have direct access to the
“Text” but needs to be mediated by the performer.2 Furthermore, we will
explore the rhetorical role of music in Barthes’ general theory of text.
The Death of the Author, “Text,” and Aleatoric Music
Poststructuralists’ re-examination of the author was stimulated by their
critique of the Enlightenment notion of the human being as rational,
autonomous, and subjectively willing. Nietzsche and Heidegger are regarded
as the two godfathers of poststructuralism because of their strong mistrust of
human reason and objectivity.3 Like Nietzsche and Heidegger, Michel
Foucault and Jacque Derrida conceive the true human subject as fragmentary,
passive, and incoherent. Foucault depicts the human being as “a caged animal”
caught in a prison of language, because the human beings have direct access to
reality only through language.4 Viewed from this perspective, all human
knowledge and reality are only linguistic conventions, not absolute truth.

1 Hereafter, “Work” and “Text” will be capitalized when they are used in Barthes’ tec-
hnical usage.
2 Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text,” in Image-Music-Text, ed. and trans. Stephen
Heath (New York: The Noonday Press, 1977), 163.
 Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-garde, Decadence,
Kitsch, Postmodernism, 2nd ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 272; and Gianni
Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, trans. Jon
R. Snyder (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 172. Calinescu says:
Neither Heidegger nor Gadamer uses the term postmodern, but many of the current phi-
losophical dicussions of posmodernity refer to their thought as a source and frequently go back to
Nietzsche, whose impact on Heidegger is well known. Little wonder then that, in the United
states and elsewhere, Heidegger is occasionally seen as the “first postmodern".
Vattimo describes Nietzscheian and Heideggerian philosophy as “weak thought” (il
pensiore debole), in direct opposition to “metaphysics” or “strong thought” – a thought  that
is “domineering, imposing, universalistic, atemporal, aggressively self-centered,
intolerant in regard to whatever appears to contradict it.” In Vattimo’s view, this “weak
thought” of Nietzscheian and Heideggerian philosophy is typically “postmodern” and
marks “the end of modernity.”
# Joyce Appleby, Margaret Jacob, and Lynn Hunt, “Postmodernism and the Crisis of
Modernity,” in Telling the Truth About History, (New York: W.W. and Norton, 1994),
213-216.
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Poststructuralists further undermine the absolute status of human being
and truth by challenging the Cartesian logocentrism that language can ex-
press the truth of reality. In poststructuralists’ linguistic and semiotic the-
ories, the traditional unidirectional relationship between the signifier and the
signified is de-stabilized. The arbitrary relationship betwen the signifier and
the signified was already a focal point of structuralists’ theories. But the
structuralist procedure of seeking out recurrent elements and their patterns is
aimed at the discovery of the “rationality,” assuming the existence of the
“essential truth” in the Text, and thus remains within the logocentric tra-
dition.5 Derrida’s critique of structuralism was:
In Western and notably French Thought, the dominant Discourse - let
us call it structuralism - remains caught, by an entire layer, sometimes the
most fecund, of its stratification, within... metaphysics-logocentrism.6
For Foucault, structuralism, is merely the last attempt to represent the
world as if it were made to be read by man. Foucault said, “structuralism
may have realized the death of Enlightenment man, but not the death of a
subject-centered discourse.”7 Poststructuralists’ critique of human subjectivity
has consequently shattered the traditional notion of the author as the owner
of his or her work, as the originator of the meaning of his or her work.
Barthes’ declaration of “The Death of the Author” epitomizes poststructu-
ralists’ skepticism about the traditional authority of the author.8 In the wake
of the author’s death, Barthes has proposed a new definition of literature:
a discursive game always arriving at the limits of its own rule, without
any author other than the reader, who is defined as an effect of the writing
game he activates.9
Barthes’ theory of “Text” in distinction from “Work” further under-
mines the traditional value attached to the author. While the meaning of the
“Work,” Barthes contends, is closed and fixed by the author, a “Text” is:
not a line of words releasing a single “theological” meaning (the
‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a
variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash.10

5 Robert Young, ed., Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader (Boston: Routledge,
1981), 4-16.
6 Quoted in Young, Untying the  Text, 15.
7 Young, Untying the Text, 10.
8 Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image-Music-Text, ed. and trans. Stephen
Heath (New York: The Noonday Press, 1977), 142-148.
9 Donald Pease, “Author,” in Critical Terms for Literary Study, ed. Frank Lentricchia
and T Thomas mc Laughlin (Chicago: the university of Chicago press, 1990), 112.
10 Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” 146.
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Traditionally, there have been many battles for a true meaning, a
definitive meaning, of a Work intended by the author. In Text, however,
meanings are to be found not in its origin but in its destinations, not in its
production but in its reception, not in the author but in the reader, since a
Text is produced, in Barthes’ terms, “in the space of the relations between
the reader and the written.” Traditionally, the reader just consumed a Work
as a passive receiver, but in a Text, the reader is no longer a mere consumer
but becomes an active co-producer of the Text.11 Barthes demands that “the
birth of the reader” must be at the cost of the death of the Author.12
In his article, “From Work to Text,” Barthes discusses aleatoric music
as an example of the “Text” which invites the birth of the reader. Barthes
does not use the term “aleatoric music,” but his description makes it obvious
that the kind of “post-serial music” he has his mind is aleatoric music.
We know that today post-serial music has radically altered the role of
the ‘interpreter’, who is called on to be in some sort the co-author of the
score, completing it rather than giving it ‘expression’. The Text is very much
a score of this new kind: it asks of the reader a pratical collaboration.13
Indeed, one can find a strong parallelism betwen John Cage’s phi-
losophy of aleatoric music and Barthes’ concept of Text. In Barthes’ theory,
the Text is a “methodological field, experienced only in an activity of pro-
duction.” In other words, it is a process rather than a thing, productivity
rather than a product.14 Likewise, Cage views that musical composition is
not an object but a process, just as the world and our lives are. “The world,
the real,” Cage notes, “is not an object. It is a process.”15 Cage is not
concerned with specific results of composition, for any resuslts obtained
from the process are just as valid as any other to him. Instead, he pursues “to
let sounds go wherever they would go, and to let them be whatever they
are.”
16
 This attitude demands to minimize compositional control, and in so
doing, undermines the role of the composer in the activity of making music,
in the similar way that Barthes and other poststructuralists challenge the
absolute authority traditionally given to the author. In some works, Cage
completely abdicated compositional control and subjectivity. In his operatic
series, Europeras, for instance, Cage did not compose a single note but
instead asked his singers to choose their favorite arias from various pre-
existent operas to fill up the entire space of the opera. This opera’s total
dependence on quotation yields a further affinity to the Barthesian “Text.”

11 Barthes, “From Work to Text,” 163-64.
12 Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” 148.
13 Barthes, “From Work to Text,” 163.
14 Young, Untying the Text, 31.
15 John Cage, For the Birds, (Boston: Marron Boyars, 1981), 80.
16 Cage, For the Birds, 74.
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Reflecting the poststructuralists’ mistrust of originality, Barthes contends
that the “text” is fundamentally a “tissue of quotations.”
The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centers of
culture..., the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never
original.17
In spite of these resemblances, however, Barthes’ postulation of ale-
atoric music as an example of text is problematic when viewed from the per-
spective of the relationship between the Text and its reader. This is because
of the non-unitary status of the reader in performative art. In musical
perfomance, the reader of a Text can be both perfomers and listeners. Unlike
literary readers, listeners do not have direct access to a “text” but need to be
mediated by the performer. Given this, the Barthesian “birth of the reader”
needs to be re-examined both from the listiner’s points of view and the
performer’s points of view.
The Comparative Status of the Performer
and the Listener in Aleatoric Music
First of all, let us examine different types of aleatoric music, since each
type engenders a different status of the performer with respect to his or her
relationship with a “Text,” a musical score. At the broadest level, aleatoric
music can be divided into three groups. In the first type, the chance element
is involved only in the process of composition, and every parameter of a
work is fixed before the moment of its performance. Cage’s Music of
Changes (1951) is an example of this type of aleatoric music. In this piece,
the composer selected duration, tempo, and dynamics by using the I-Ching,
an ancient Chinese book that prescribes methods for arriving at random
numbers. Only pitches were determined by the composer. Similarly, Iannis
Xenakis used probability theories to determine the microscopic details in
many of his composition, including Pithoprakta (1955-56), the literal mea-
ning of which is “actions by means of probability.” This work comprises of
four sections, each of which is distinguished from the others primarily by
textural and timbral characteristics, such as glissandi and pizzicati. The
sectional division at the macroscopic level and the collective characteristics
of each section are designed and controlled by the composer, but the
individual components of sound are generated by mathematical theories. For
instance, when Xenakis chose glissandi and pizzicati as the main sonic
events of the second section, microscopic details, such as which pitches and
dynamics to use, were determined by probability theories, in the similar way
that Cage used I-Ching in Music of Changes. In this type of aleatoric music,
composers allow elements of chance to occur only in the process of
composing, and the results obtained from this process are notated without

17 Barthes, “The death of the author,” 146.
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allowing the performer to change the written score. The role of performers
and listeners remains as passive as in traditional music. A counterpart of this
type of aleatoric music in visual art would be Jackson Pollock’s “action
painting,’ which is created by pouring or dripping paint onto the canves in a
spontaneous manner. A chance element is incorporated at the time of
painting, but what is presented to the viewers is a fixed and finished object.
The second type of aleatoric music incorporates chance elements in
performance. The composer provides notated events but their arrangement is
left to the determination of the performer. Karlheinz Stockhausen’s lavi-
erstück XI (1956) is an example. This work contains nineteen events which
are composed and notated in a traditional way. The arrangement of these
events, however, is not determined until the performer decides prior to the
performance. Earle Brown’s Available forms II (1962) is intended to be
performed in the same way, except that in this piece the conductor is asked
to “spontaneously” decide the order of the events at the very moment of
performance (EXAMPLE 1). This work is composed for two orchestras, which
are to play simultaneously. The score for each orchestra consists of four
pages. Each page contains either four or five musical events, each of which
differs from each other in its sound characteristics, such as articulation,
density, contour, timbre, etc. In order to perform this work, the conductors,
working independently of each other, choose one combination of the given
events. As the title suggests, each performance is meant to be one of the
available realizations of the piece. This piece was inspired by Alexander
Calder’s mobile sculpture, which consists of several parts that move in
space, continuously changing their spatial dispositions before the viewers’
eyes, yet not losing its identity as a single work because of the limited
relationships among its parts.
The third type of aleatoric music contains the greatest degree of inde-
terminacy. In this type, traditional musical notation is replaced by visual or
verbal signs which instruct or only suggest the ways a work can be perfor-
med. Graphic score pieces are examples of the third type. In Earle Brown’s
December 1952 (1952), lines and rectangles of various lengths and thickne-
sses replace traditional musical notes (EXAMPLE 2). The lines and
rectangles may read as implying direction, loudness, duration, ant pitch. The
performer chooses how to read the sonic implications of the graphic sings.
Similarly, Morton Feldman’s Intersection No. 2 (1951) for piano solo is wri-
tten on coordinate paper. The squares viewed horizontally represent a time
unit, while three vertical squares in each row suggest relative pitch levels -
high, middle and low. The number in a box tells how many keys are to be
played. The performer determines what particular pitches and rhythms to
play. (EXAMPLE  3). Christian Wolff’s Duo for Pianists, II (1958) has only
a verbal indication for a broad limitation, such as the use of pianos with no
silences between the two performers. The beginning and the ending of the
piece are determined by the situation under which performance takes place.
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The score of Cage’s Variations II (1961) shows both graphic and verbal
notations. It consists of eleven transparent plastic sheets: six of them contain
the drawing of straight lines, one line for each sheet, and each of the
remaining five sheets carries one black dot. The composer provided the
performer with the verbal instructions for how to create scores by using the
given sheets and how to realize the scores (EXAMPLE 4). There are many
ways of creating a score for this piece, and many more ways of realizing it
once it is created.
In the second and third types of aleatoric music, it is not listeners but
only performers who are promoted to the rank of co-author of the works. At
the moment of performance, listeners hear only a rendition chosen and fixed
by performers; the openness of aleatoric music is closed and fixed at the
time of performance. Carl Dahlhaus has remarked upon this closed openness
on the listener’s side:
By “open forms” one understood, first, pieces in which individual sec-
tion are fixed and unalterable, yet where the sequence of the sections is
variable and left to the performer. The variability is, however, aesthetically
fictitious. For the listener it does not exist; he does not relate the version he
is hearing to other possible ones the performer could have chosen but did
not choose. What is a variable form on paper is fixed in performance; and
insofar as form is a category that refers to the perceivable result and not to
the method, “open form” is not “open.”18
Cage’s 4’ 33” is known as the most radically indeterminate in the repe-
rtoire of aleatoric music. The notation of this piece has only a verbal indi-
cation, which specifies broad aspects of the piece, such as the number of
section and the total length of the work. The word, “tacet’” written between
the roman numeral marking of each section indicates that performers should
be silent during each section (EXAMPLE 5). In David Tudor’s premiere of
4’ 33”, he indicated  the beginnings and the endings of threee sections by
closing and opening the keyboard cover, respectively. What Cage intended
in this silent piece was to make the audience experience the sounds from
their environment. He has noted:
You could hear the wind stirring outside during the first movement (in
the premiere). During the second, raindrops began pattering the roof, and
during the third the people themselves made all kinds of interesting sounds
as they talked or walked out.19
Cage’s 4’ 33” certainly invites the audience to engage, through its own
sounds, in the making of the work as co-author and performer. David Tu-

@ Carl Dahlhaus, Schoenberg and the New Music, trans. Derrick Puffectt and Alfred
Clayton (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), 261-22.
8 Quoted in Richard Kostelanetz, ed., “Ur-Conversation with John Cage,” Perspectives
of New Music 25 (summer 1987): 97.
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dor’s performance was indeed a ritual, in which the moments of composition
and performance collapse and the audience create and experience together
what Barthes called “textasy,” “an ecstatic loss of the subject in a textual
coming.”20 This type of “textasy” can be found in Robert Rauschenberg’s
“all white paintings,” which are often regarded as a visual counterpart of
Cage’s 4’33”. These paintings are nothing but empty white canvases,
waiting for shadows cast by spectators. Spectators complete the work by
becoming the objects on empty canvases, and in so doing, they become co-
author of the work.
In Cage’s 4’ 33”, however, the role of the listener as a co-author is only
conditional. Although performers are asked to remain silent by the indica-
tion of the word “tacet,” this silence is overridden by Cage’s verbal
instruction, which reads, “However, the work may be performed by an
instrumentalist or combination of instrumentalists and last any length of
time.”21 During David Tudor’s monumental performance, the audience was
invited to fill up the temporal space of the piece with its own sounds, and
thus became a co-author and a performer of the piece. But if a performer
fills up the duration of 4’33” entirely with his or her own music, then the
listener would remain as passive as in the performance of any traditional,
non-aleatoric music. It is the performer who decides whether or not to give
participational space to the listener.
This privileging of the performer has been a major target in the criti-
cism of Cagean aleatoric music. Xenakis pointed out that in the open-form
compositions, it is the performer who is promoted to the rank of composer
by the composer himself, and thus the result is a substitution of authors.22
Morton Feldman has discovered the same flaw.
After several years of writing graphic music I began to discover its
most important flaw. I was not only allowing the sounds to be free—I was
also liberating the performer.23
As Feldman, Xenakis, and Dahlhaus indicated, what one sees at the
wake of the author’s death in aleatoric music is the birth of the performer,
not the birth of the listener, as Barthes conceived.

 Quoted in Young, Untying the Text, 32.
 John Cage, 4’ 33” (New York: Henmar Press Inc., 1960). In the second version of
4’33” (1962), Cage further loosenned the performing restructions of the work by defining
it as a “solo to be performed in any way by anyone” (see Example 6). Peter Pfister made
one of its realizations at his electronic studio in Switzerland.
 Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music: Thought and Mathematics in Composition, 2nd
ed. (New York: Pendragon Press, 1992), 38.
 Morton Feldman, Essays (Kerpen: Beginner Press, 1985), 38.
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The Figure of Music in Barthes’ Theory of Text
Our goal is not to refute Barthes’ theory of text by simply upholding the
difference in perfomance art, especially in music. Rather, a deeper implica-
tion of performance art’s provocation can be entertained by asking what role
this “difference” played in Barthes’ dicision to turn to musical examples.
That is, what rhetorical role does music play in Barthes’ theory of text?
Our answer in a nutshell is this: Barthes’ theory of text is irreparably
burdened by a paradoxical tension, to which music provides a rhetorical
solution (precisely because of its “difference”). The tension is between the
para-historical and historicism; between, on the one hand, Barthes’ defining
of the Text in a transphenomenal sense, as an experience that transcends
historically specific authors, text-artifacts, and readership, and, on the other,
his need to demonstrate the same through historically-situated instances of
authors and texts. In short, it is the problem of discussing the trend towards
authorlessness in terms of the history which is demarcated by authors. Let us
elaborate this tension.
Time and again, Barthes warns that the removal of the Author is not
merely a historical fact or explainable by “declaring certain literary produc-
tions in and others out by virtue of their chronological situation.”24
For, the Text is a certain primordial law of the sign that has been exer-
ting its force always already. He opens “The Death of the Author” by spea-
king of this timeless relation between writing and the subject:
Writing is the destruction of every voice, of every voice, of every point
of origin... As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting
directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any
function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this
disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin....  No doubt it has always
been that way.25
For him, it is only the Work which is a historical phenomenon, a product of
historically identifiable regimes of institutional and ideological forces.
Specifically, the phenomenon of Work coincides with the bourgeois demo-
cracy in the West, the high point of the capitalist ideology with its worship
of the prestige of the individual, where a work of art is “consumed” with the
stamp of the Author. From this view, the instance of the Work is but the
bourgeois democratic ideology’s momentary interruption of the timeless
force of the Text. Then, the birth of the reader is in fact a re-birth.
Having so defined the Text only as a negatively historical phenomenon,
is opposition to the epoch of the Work, the question of where the Work
stops and the Text begins becomes a hopelessly elusive logical problem for
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Barthes; once the explains the birth of the Author (or the Work) within
history, showing its undoing outside the history becomes an impossible task.
And Barthes slips repeatedly: while the moment of the Text is supposed to
be recognized as nameless, ownerless instances, he tells us time and again
that its name in fact is Mallarmé, Genet, Proust, etc.; he cannot do without to
the heroes of conscientious interventions in the ideological regime of the
Work, towards the Text. In sum, Barthes vacillates betwen having the “birth
of the reader” as an innovation and as a return (to the primordial ways of
writing / reading relation that has been “always that way”); simultaneously
as a historical phenomenon (identifiable by such and such authors) and as a
para-historical, authorless law of the sign.
How does music intervene in this paradox? First of all, we have to
recognize that music is not a marginal subject in Barthes’ theory of text. It is
through music, not through the literary tradition, that he reveals the most
straightforward and specific examples of the Work and the Text; through
music history, he reveals the most tangible “chronology” of where the Work
stops and the Text begins. However, as we will show presently, the speci-
ficity Barthes purchases through musical example concretizes but at the
same time disrupts the entire logic of his theory of text.
We argue that music’s “difference,” which prompts Barthes to seek in it
the examples he is reluctant to articulate within the literary tradition, lies
precisely in its irreducible presence of the performer. First, the musical
scene provides him with an ideal example for the historical lapse into the
Work, for the institutional intervening of the performer in music palpably
demonstrates  the growing distance between the “author” and the “reader.”
In contrast, vis-a-vis the literary tradition, Barthes largely remains silent
about what actual changes in the textual form and its relation to the reader
took place with the advent of the Work—while he liberally discusses the
ideological milieu surrounding the change. He relegates this task to musical
examples, as it were. In music, he observes, this era is characterized by the
degradation from the music that is played, which he calls musica practica,26
to the music that is passively listened to. In this era, practicing amateurs who
listen as one would play, once numerous in the previous age, disappear.
Instead, between the composer and the listener, there intervenes the profe-
ssional performers and music critics who assign upon themselves the task of
interpreting “the soul” of the Genius behind a piece of work that supposedly
remains inaccessible to amateurs. In short, the trend of the Work in music
has momentarily suspended the para-historical phenomenon of musica
practica.
Second, a sociological and historical specificity thus purchased, Barthes
discusses the emmergence of musical equivalent of the Text with far less

26 Roland Barthes, “Musica Practica,” in Image-Music-Text, ed. and trans. Stephen
Heath (New York: The Noonday Press, 1977), 149-154.
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inhibition (than in his discussion on the literary tradition) towards naming
the historical author. His para-historical stance virtually disappears, and
Barthes is more willing to entertain the idea of the moment of musical Text
as a historical epoch: it coincides with aleatoric music that he described as
“post-serial music.” “Today aleatoric music has radically altered the role of
the “interpreter”, Barthes declares.27  Just as the reading of the “modern”
text consists not in passive receiving but in writing anew, he continues, “the
modern listener ... puts oneself in the position... of an operator, who knows
how to displace, assemble, combine, fit together...”28
Then, how does he explain the sudden irrelevance of music’s historical
intermediaries, especially the performer, in aleatoric music? Here, Barthes
becomes ambivalent. After the above optimistic pronouncement that it is we,
the listeners, who are playing the “modern” musical scores, he quickly adds:
“though still it is true by proxy.” Here, in this swift qualification, we get a
glimpse of Barthes’s hesitant yet evident desire to collapse the experience of
the listener onto that of the performer; that is, his desire to see alaeatoric
music as a sort of “return” of musica practica. What warrants this return of
an unmediated relationship between the performer and the listener? Is it “in
the score,” so to speak? Or is it in the social setting? How is such an unme-
diated relationship conceivable today, when we are in fact even more
inundated, than the age of the Enlightment itself, with the electronic and
commodity mediations of the images of the composer as individual hero, the
charismatic performer, and the recording as a perfect performance of a
piece? This kind of “sociological” calling into question is inevitable given
Barthes’ allowing of a historical specificity via aleatoric music. But he
remains silent on such an essential detail.
Towards the very end of the same argument, Barthes admits in passing
that this—the “birth of the listener” with aleatoric music—is an ideal
picture, a “utopia.” Why does he suddenly lapse into a prescriptive mode
when it comes to the question of the music listener? It is as if Barthes resorts
to “utopia” precisely because he is secretly aware of the fact that, as we have
been at pains to show, the epoch of aleatoric music is no less Author-centered
(from the point of view of the listener), that this epoch is thick with institu-
tionalized intermediaries such as the performer. It is as if Barthes, after
inscribing the advent of the performer as a historical and sociological phe-
nomenon, tries to wish it away from the aleatoric music. The musical exam-
ple, with its tangible institutionalization of mediators, illuminates Barthes'
rhetoric but only to bite back in the end.
Drawing on the above observations, we conclude that in Barthes' theory
of text, music serves as the lowest and the highest examples. At the lowest,

27 See note # 13 above.
28 Barthes, “Musica Practica,” 153.
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music history demonstrates the clearest case of the trend towards consum-
ption, i.e., the severance of the "author" from the "reader" by the inter-
vention of the professional performer. At the highest, aleatoric music is an
ideal example of the Text, much more than any literary text can be. The two,
the lowest and the highest, are inseparably locked in Barthes' logic: it is
precisely because music is haunted by the irreducible intervention of the
performer that its supposed absence in aleatoric music is liberating. How
liberating? The latter, for Barthes, is the moment when the performer fuses
with the listener – i.e., the musica practica. It is interesting that in his
literary examples (of "the modern text"), such a "transference" of perfor-
mativity predominantly concerns the author; hardly ever the reader.  (Thus
his extolling of Mallarmé's "authorless" language play, Brecht's "distan-
cing," etc.) When it comes to the reader's performative empowerment,
Barthes resorts to hopelessly abstract and "intangible" phenomena such as
"intertextuality." But from the model of musica practica – the sensual and
bodily merger of the performer with the listener, the playing and the hearing
– he finds a much more reified and "situated" mis-en-scène of the ideal
readership. Such is the role of music in Barthes' theory of text.
– a shorter version of this paper was presented at the 16th Congress of
the IMS in London, 1997-
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